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The AVALON HILL

GENERAL

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☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ **GENERAL**

The AVALON HILL **GENERAL**
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Avalon Hill Philosophy - Part 25

The Wargame Convention

Long suffering subscribers to this magazine have, in the past, been inundated in information dealing with the wargame convention. The camps have been divided on this subject; between those who think they serve no purpose at all to those who claim "this is really where the action is at."

"After all," state disclaimers, "the conventions satisfy the appetites of only a miniscule number of wargamers — why all the big fuss???"

"From little toe corns big blokes grow," we always say. And it has been the big blokes from all those little wargame clubs working behind the scenes that have been responsible for the growth of wargaming outside the commeraderie of known convention cultists. This, of course, means that the disclaimers' assumptions are in error.

There is no doubt that thousands more would be in attendance if convention sites were made available to all.

The major wargame groups are beginning to realize that they are sitting on top of a human powderkeg of enthusiasts — and are making plans in the right direction ... that being "regionals" which, hopefully, will bring out a lot more from the wargames woodwork.

Our preachings of seven years are beginning to bear fruit. One such example is I.G.B. That stands for Interest Group Baltimore, a wargame group that was located right in our backyard without us even knowing about it — until shortly before Thanksgiving when direct phone contact was made by Randy Reed.



During an 11th hour break, remaining diehards of the 60+ that attended IGB pose for pix taken by early-morning milk man. Optimist Club House in Perry Hall, Md., was scene of Thanksgiving weekend bash.

tacted Randy Reed, who in turn contacted AH with info on the IGB's Thanksgiving convention.

Others shown on the cover are, standing left to right: Tony Morale, Dave Roberts, and Steve Smith. Roberts and Smith, along with Dulaney and Reed, form the "triumvirate" that is the motivating force behind the activities of the IGB (see Philosophy this issue.) Morale and Pritchard are co-chairmen of an east-coast convention to be held in June on board the U.S.S. Massachusetts.

Gentlemen — we salute you, and hope that your example will encourage many others to step forward and begin building Interest Groups of their own in their own locales.

Without the customary fanfare, publicity, or notice to *The General*, IGB had planned a day-long wargame gathering featuring a variety of wargame play luring such notables as Tony Morale and Phil Pritchard from their far-off haunts.

Avalon Hill management had never before attended a full-blooded wargame gathering in the flesh. We convinced them "now was the time." Priming themselves first by dining at nearby Nichebai-Kai, a Japanese culinary establishment, they burst in on the IGB gathering with yells of "banzai." The not-too-impressed throng merely pointed them to the Midway table and returned to their game-boards, unabashed.

Needless to say it was AH management that was impressed; not only by the organizational decorum of the group but by the skill and knowledge with which each game was being played. Most significant, however, was their realization that a great deal of time, effort, and resources go into bringing a convention, however small, to fruition.

"We didn't realize how sophisticated the hard core fanatics have become," mused company Vice-President A. Eric Dott to Marketing Director Tom Shaw who had accompanied him to the Perry Hall, Maryland sight of the IGB gathering. When told by several gamers in attendance that this sort of thing is happening all over the country, Dott was quick to suggest to Shaw that management do even more in promoting the convention syndrome. "Yeah, that way we'll sell more games ... right Mr. Dott?", was Shaw's electrifyingly intelligent response.

The Fall River Conclave

Hardly had the embers of the IGB flames cooled when plans were being laid for another, more ambitious regional gathering. Phil Pritchard announced at the IGB the possibility of Spartan International sponsoring a regional east-coast conclave on board the U.S.S. Massachusetts moored at Fall River, Massachusetts.

That possibility has become a reality. The SICL (Spartan International) very definitely has contracted to hold a convention June 5-6, 1971 aboard the "Big Mamie ... the ship that helped turn the tide of history," as their brochure states. And thanks to Pritchard's up-to-the-minute communications with our staff, we are able to provide all pertinent data to subscribers well in advance. A most unusual convention it will be, a tour of Big Mamie alone worth the price of the registration costs.

Spartan co-chairmen Tony Morale and Phil Pritchard will be glad to furnish all travel info and costs. Advance registrations: Spartan members — \$1.25/day, non-members — \$1.50/day. Registration at the door: Spartan members — \$1.50/day, non-members — \$2.00/day. When you consider that the normal admission to Big Mamie is \$2.00, participants are in effect getting in on the convention tournament at below cost.

Displays, informal gaming, and umpired tournament games will all be conducted right on board

COVER STORY

A typical example of what goes on in the wargaming world without our knowledge is Interest Group Baltimore. Only by chance did Avalon Hill learn of their existence, and by all indications IGB appears to be representative of hundreds of like groups that prefer to remain anonymous. Even the guiding lights of IGB hold no official positions ... "the satisfaction of seeing wargaming flourish is reward enough," expostulates Randy Reed (standing at right on cover photo.)

AH's first knowledge of IGB's existence came about through a request by Phil Pritchard (seated at right) who wrote merely to say that he would be passing through Baltimore during Thanksgiving and ... "could we put him in contact with any Baltimore game fanatics? ..." Although AH does not maintain a geographic file of its customers, some of the regulars do stand out in memory. One such fellow is Clay Dulaney (seated left) who was contacted by AH, who in turn con-

the U.S.S. Massachusetts in the Ward Room, Crew's Mess, and Admirals Quarters as specified on the printed Convention schedule now available from Pritchard, Harvard University, Richards Hall 303, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

On Sunday, June 6, Sparta's 5th anniversary will be celebrated with a continuation of June 5th activities plus the Banquet and Post-banquet Seminar that will be held in the Admiral's Quarters. The Seminar will feature "explanation and theory" and a question and answer debate involving audience participation.

A far cry from the days of the back yard garage conventions, eh!

From Casablanca to Kimishi

At Casablanca the Massachusetts became the first battleship to fire 16 inch guns on the enemy in World War II, when she returned a salvo from the Jean Bart, the newest battleship in the Vichy French Navy, to put her out of action with five direct hits. Three years later she fired the last shot from a ship of her class when her guns destroyed what was left of the Japanese factories and docks in Kamishi.

All told Big Mamie fought 35 engagements, including Leyte Gulf, and earned 11 battle stars. It is on board this very ship, raised from the scrap pile by school donations, where the SICL will conduct "similar" engagements but without the customary shedding of human lives.

The convention schedule allows time for a tour of the ship itself, which rests permanently at Battleship Cove as a national tourist attraction. It is to the credit of Pritchard, Morale, and all SICL members involved for their selection of this unusual attraction as the sight for the 2nd annual east coast convention.

More than a million visitors to Battleship Cove attest to its worthwhile nature; the ship itself with its seven decks and accommodations for 2500 officers and men will offer conventioners an unusually memorable experience. Going one better, the SICL will publish and distribute three issues of a convention newsletter which will include latest information on the events, accommodations, and side trips. Brochures from the ship will also be supplied upon receipt of 10 cents; all of which comes free to those registering early for the convention. (This means sending cash now.)

Marine Museum

And for the Naval Nut, a Marine Museum is located right across from Battleship Cove. Here another great era is brought to life; the steamboat era from Robert Fulton to the Fall River Line of the present day. Complete information on this Museum will also be supplied to those making early registrations along with information how to get there.

Fall River, Massachusetts is centered between Boston (50 miles to the north) Worcester (63 miles to the northwest) Newport, R.I. (20 miles to the southwest) and Cape Cod, Mass. (38 miles to the southeast.)

The glamour of the attraction notwithstanding, the SICL plans a busy schedule of tournament activities. Makers of No-Dose Tablets should enjoy a brisk spurt of business.

There will be, of course, a considerable number of other conventions and tournaments set for the spring and summer months — the Fall River jobbie being cited here only to demonstrate to what level of sophistication wargaming has

reached. The sponsoring group is known only too well to subscribers of this magazine. For those who are new to it all, we need only to call your attention to the Vol. 7, No. 2 back issue which



Stalwarts of the IGB abandon Afrika Korps and Anzio in favor of new game, Panzerblitz — the latter game among those donated by AH for door prizes.



Then There Was...

by Dick Trtek

Despite its successes, Avalon Hill has experienced its share of failure. Aging copies of *Civil War* and *Chancellorsville* lying in musty attics bear witness to occasional misfires. I was not aware, however, of the extent of their past mistakes until I chanced upon an old promotional brochure lodged in a volume of poetry by Shelley. Though faded and nearly illegible, the folder detailed AH games that for one reason or another never were big sellers. These titles and the accompanying ad copy I share with you now:

Fishing Strategy — "Could you catch the 'big ones?' Find out in this thrilling game of piscatorial sport. Pit various baits against schools of salmon, bass, and trout, with unique Nibble Results Table determining the outcome. Advanced game version includes such refinements as trolling, variable fish hunger, and optional species."

Denmark, 1940 — "It's early in World War II, and Hitler is turning his eyes westward. Norway is the next major target, but little Denmark stands in the way. The real campaign took only one day. As the Danish commander, could you do better? Find out in this thrilling re-inactment of the historic invasion."

featured the SICL under the "Club of the Month" editorial report. Massachusetts might be the opposite end of the country to their California base but its nationwide list of members work faithfully and diligently toward the common cause of fostering the art of wargaming as another acceptable form of social intercourse.

"Well, at least it keeps 'em out of the pool halls," Shaw waxed philosophically during the IGB windup. But a manner more fitting of the dignity of his management position, Vice President Dott reflected, "if all tournaments were being conducted in the same fashion as was IGB, then it's a shame that anyone has to miss out on such a rewarding experience as that of participating in a wargame convention."

So, dear reader, keep attuned to this magazine. Where you will be informed as early and as often as possible in the hopes that attendance by every willing member of the gaming fraternity to a convention can be made a reality. Wargamers — wherever you are — send us all the info you can, whenever you can, on all planned activities of this nature.

Shanghai — "As Chinese as Chairman Mao, Shanghai is so authentic the game board is printed in Chinese. The Opium Wars were significant milestones in Chinese relations with the West. Refight them with this captivating simulation. See if you can change history with the many 'what if' variations possible."

Crusade — "Relive Medieval holy wars against the Infidels in this game authenticated by Richard the Lion-hearted himself. Unique features include Peter the Hermit unit and special Divine Intervention Table. Actually seven games in one: basic, advanced, and tournament versions; and mini-games such as 'Jerusalem' and 'Holy Grail.'"

1915 — "The Rand Corporation gagged when it saw this startling recreation of Italy's exciting entry into World War I. Could you break the stalemate on the Western Front by winning a decisive victory in the Austrian Alps? Play this game, with its realistic ten-step reduction system and triple-matrix combat results table, and find out."

Discarding the yellowed brochure, I went back to reading "Prometheus Unbound." Maybe Toynbee was right after all, I thought. Cycles do repeat themselves.

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The Honor System

by Mathew Buynoski

The most persistent roadblock to realism in AH games has been the players' perfect intelligence concerning enemy dispositions, movements, and strength.

Many methods have been proposed to deal with this: hidden movement, upside-down units, three boards, etc. Except for those games with relatively few units, most of these attempts at creating uncertainties lengthen the game to the time span of the real campaign. Playability suffers.

The honor system is designed to give the best of both worlds. If properly used it can create the requisite unknowns and is just as playable as a normal AH game. Note the "if," it is important. This will work neither for those whose sole objective is to win, regardless of how unrealistic the game becomes, nor their brethren, the rules nit-pickers. If you are interested in realism (and have an opponent you trust), read on.

The actual remedy is both simple and difficult at the same time. There is no change in the actual play, units of both sides remain in both players' views. Players are, however, honor-bound to use only "legal" information, that which would be normally available to a field commander. Rules for determining what this information is vary from game to game (see example games below).

The major difficulty is a human one: mental discipline. It takes some doing to waltz into a trap you can see on the board, but not in "reality." Would you do it, or would you modify your original plan and charge it off to intuition? That's not meant to insult, because I do it myself if I let my concentration dissipate. There are hints to help yourself in this regard. Write up a master plan at the start, allotting forces, assigning objectives, and setting up a timetable. Before each turn, look away and imagine a board; mull over the information you have and make your tactical decisions. Otherwise, you will find your planning unconsciously starts to use illegal information. Discuss the situation with your opponent, and state your reasons for making certain moves. Often you will find that the reason(s) are at best questionable, and you should rethink the move. If that sounds like high treason, remember he is honor-bound not to use the information.

Below are two games adapted for the honor system. The rules for information are my own; if they do not suit you, or strike you as unrealistic, change them.

Example 1, land tactical game, *Bulge*.

Bulge, and the IFW and S&T versions of the same battle, are all representations of a fast-moving, fluid, confused and ever-changing situation. In the real campaign, both the overall

commanders (that's who you represent as a player) had not much more information than what enemy formations were vaguely in what area, and where his own forward positions were. To recreate this, restrict legal information to:

1. When attacking, you are told only in what squares the enemy troops are in, — the division(s) they come from, and whether or not the odds are worse than 1-6. I.e., you know where he is, who he is, but, as befits a fast-moving situation, not exactly how strong he is.

2. When attacked, you are told what division(s) are attacking.

3. Germans know what Allied divisions are in the game (in the real campaign, their radio-interception service did great work at locating Allied movements), but the Allies identify only those divisions that attack him — the rest are "not in the game."

In addition, divisional organization should be respected since otherwise the intelligence above is worthless and realism suffers. The US 28, 106, and 9 Armor divisions are excepted, as they scattered in the real campaign. To some extent this rule recreates the necessity of local control of parts of the front. One-way roads and some German supply limitations are also realistic and should be included.

One or two comments are in order on the effects of the honor system on the game. The German will have to concentrate a great amount of effort on securing road junctions, and it is precisely there that the Allies make their hardest stands. Since you are not told the odds until after moving and it is too late to change, you must allot attacking forces more on the importance of the objective than the immediate strength of enemy units on square "X". The Allies will find it imperative to keep a line, or otherwise an aggressive German will exploit and get in rear areas unobserved. At the start, roadblock and road-junction defenses will hamper the Germans best. Both sides will find reserves essential — the Allies to counter German blows and possible breakthroughs, the German to exploit any weakness, or cover against counter-attack.

Tactics should include moving flanks first to cover the main assault, and feelers to find exact locations before committing the attack force. Even if you don't know the strength in any one square, it is at least helpful to find exactly what squares the enemy is in. Active patrolling on quiet sectors prevents embarrassment.

Example 2, naval game, *Jutland*

Jutland is simply a different game under the honor system. Considerable skull work is necessary to work out tactics, especially for light ships.

Besides the ability to see the enemy too clearly, *Jutland* suffers by allowing too perfect control of your own fleet. Transmission of complete movement and firing orders every 10 minutes is a bit much.

Therefore, *Jutland* needs two rules, and an exception, for honor system play.

Rule I is an approximation to simultaneous movement. Before the movement portion of the turn, each player contemplates the information available to him: which enemy units are in sighting range of his ships, where said units are going. On the basis of this, plus the status of your own damage, plot out your best move. When both players have done this, move the ship counters as you had decided. By the way, it's best to move those ships making "daring" maneuvers first — avoids arguments.

To counter the excessive fire control, Rule II attempts to recreate the fact that both sides had to rely on prearranged tactics in an engagement. Firing is done on either of two bases. When there is discernable organization, lines facing lines, every ship fires at its opposite number. When a real melee develops, each ship fires at the nearest target. However, if locally there is a short line vs. short line situation under the nearest target rule, these two lines fire at opposite numbers.

The great exception to both rules is the handling of torpedo attacks. In this case, select a target ship in advance of the movement portion of the turn, and move attacking DD's to that ship. You are honor-bound to pick targets that are in range of the attackers. If, as sometimes happens, enemy movements make it impossible to reach the intended target, DD's may attack a target of opportunity near by the intended victim. In countering torpedo attacks, light ships may ignore previous orders and rush to defend; capital ships may ignore opposite-number firing orders and shoot at the DD's within 6,000 yards of them (I allow this because it can be considered a local melee, and because both sides were so afraid of torpedo attacks). It is best, under this rule, to set a moving order of daring capital ships, rest of the capital ships, torpedo-attacking DD's, and finally remaining light ships.

The effect on play is large. The fire at opposites rule almost negates the German protection advantage, since he can not concentrate enough firepower to achieve one-turn sinkings unless he can cause a confused situation, or has a numerical advantage on the battlefield. Broadside becomes the major factor in the battle; German ships will need to turn around often to bring undamaged guns into play on their *Posen*, *Ostfriesland*, and *Kaiser* class ships, since British battle ships in general have a larger broadside than their German counterparts. Scouting will assume much greater importance; proper use of light ships to screen and drive in enemy screens, and not lose inordinate numbers to enemy capital ships, is difficult. The British have a definite advantage here in that they outnumber the Germans 28 to 11 in CL's, and 106 to 59 in DD's (additional forces included).

As a last note, I recommend you do not use this system unless playing full-scale; for some reason it appears incompatible with the 1/3-scale version.

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Winning with the Wehrmacht

by Alan Augenbraun



To those of you who have had the courage to tempt defeat by taking the German side in *D-Day '65*, I don't have to recount the disadvantages and problems facing the German commander. It seems a shame that the fine German armored divisions have but a slim chance of wreaking their wrath on the Allied invaders. Assuming that the panzers do get within range of the inferior Allied forces, Allied airpower is there to decimate them. No wonder then that the Opponent Wanted ads almost always seek German players! Never were there such easy pickings!

Before I proceed with my variant, let me justify it with an analysis of *D-Day*. The situation of June, 1944, is not accurately represented in the game. For example, the Allies were in no position to invade South France on June 6th for, dependent on surprise as the Allies were, it was impossible for their 5,000 ships carrying hundreds of thousands of troops to sail from Great Britain to South France unnoticed by the Germans. Besides, the trip would have taken too long. If you argue that an invasion force could have been diverted from Italy, you will find that, although the assault on South France (Operation Dragoon) was scheduled for early June, operations in Italy precluded this invasion. Allied troops in Italy could not yet be spared.

Furthermore, the Allies did not wish to invade the heavily defended Calais area because of the resistance they would encounter and because they could not achieve much of a surprise in that sector. Areas east of Calais were not conducive to amphibious operations for a variety of reasons. The Bay of Biscay likewise afforded little chance of surprise, and it too was rejected as a possible landing area. This left Normandy and Brittany, and the logical Allied choice was Normandy because of its proximity to Britain. There were, however, other strategical considerations as well which led to this decision.

If you will compare reality with situation in *D-Day*, you will immediately observe that the Allied players is not hampered by the problems of SHAEF in 1944. Everything is as easy as pie: pick out a nice, easy invasion beach, land your troops and kill the Krauts. This, however, is not the way it happened.

On the other hand, the German player is burdened with all of the mistakes committed by the German High Command. Although I won't go into details here, take my word for it that had

Rommel's requests to OKW and Hitler been carried out and had the Germans not been bunglers and self-deceiving fools, we might very well have lost all our marbles in that gambit on June 6. This opinion is based on very extensive research on the subject.

Thus, the German player bears the onus of someone else's errors committed 25 years ago. Is this not unfair? Are we not given "command" of our forces and the power to initiate and execute strategical policy rather than having decisions made for us?

Let me cite just one example such as the failure of the Germans to use the Luftwaffe in offensive operations. More than one historian has expressed surprise at the Germans' failure to bomb the "easy targets" on the beaches. You will recall, I trust, that despite the thousands of aircraft in the sky on D-Day, TWO lone German fighters managed to strafe the invasion beaches and return to base unscathed. One writer, commenting on German minelaying operations, declared that Allied anti-aircraft fire was not very effective even though it was heavy.

My variant aims at correcting some of the faults in *D-Day*. It consists of several optional rules or modifications which are listed below.

I. *German Order of Battle*: My research has uncovered the fact that the 10th SS Panzer Division, together with the 9th SS Panzer, formed the II SS Panzer Corps. So, add the 10th SS (6-6-4) to the German OB and place it with the 9th SS on any of the starred squares in Germany.

II. *Invasion Areas*: An invasion of South France may not occur until the ninth turn.

III. *Weather*: The Normandy invasion depended very heavily on the weather. This can be simulated by the following conditions:

To invade in the first week, you must roll a 1, 2, 3 or 4

To invade in the second week, you must roll a 1, 2, 3 or 4

To invade in the third week, you must roll a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5

You may automatically invade in the 4th week. In this way, bad weather can delay the invasion by a month just as it might have done in Normandy.

IV. *Coastal Defense*: It seems logical to me that if defense factors are doubled when a unit is attacked from across a river, defense factors should also be doubled when a unit is attacked from the sea. (The Omaha Beach landing was

almost aborted because of the fierce resistance and the high casualty rate inflicted by the German 352nd Infantry.) This rule does not apply to Static Divisions and HQ units and does not apply to any unit attacked from sea and land at the same time.

V. *German Air Force*: In June, 1944, there were 481 German aircraft in France, including more than 150 fighters. (NOTE: While this number is very small compared to Allied figures, don't overlook the fact that German planes made runs over the beaches on D-Day and were completely unhindered by Allied aircraft.) Immediately after the invasion proper, 1,000 aircraft reinforcements were flown in from Germany and Italy. These carried out nightly raids from June 7th on. While Allied anti-aircraft fire was intense, it was not very damaging.

Now, the Allies had 5,800 bombers and 4,900 fighters in action during the invasion. This makes for a total of 10,700 aircraft. With that number, the Allies are entitled to eight air strikes per game. Proportionately, the Germans should be entitled to one air strike. Further, in the second week or turn of play, the V-1 came into use. Of the 18,000 bombs launched, 10,160 were fired against targets on the continent. These v-1's can be transformed into five air strikes. In the 18th week, 1,750 V-2's were launched against continental targets. This can be transformed into a single additional air strike. The following chart should be used for all German air power:

DIE ROLL	RESULTS
1, 2 or 3	no effect
4&5	units immobilized
6	½ defending units eliminated

No German units can be next to units under buzz-bomb attack. The Germans are limited to two air strikes per turn.

VI. *The Great Storm*: No air operations are permitted during the third week of the game due to a very severe storm over the English Channel.

VII. *Allied Order of Battle*: The following changes should be made: Add the British 15th Infantry (4-4-4) on D-Day, the U.S. 86th Infantry (4-4-4) on the 32nd week and the 1st Allied Airborne Army HQ (0-1-4) on the 32nd week. REMOVE the British 50th Infantry by the 43rd week and the British 1st Airborne by the 31st week.

While my variant may yet throw the game in favor of the Germans, I see nothing wrong in that. After all, nobody cried about the Allies' easy victory! Again, had the circumstances in 1944 been different, perhaps the war — but certainly the campaign — might have gone in favor of the Axis powers. It was an act of G-d that saved the free world at Normandy.

Perhaps further research will uncover additional German forces, but for the present, I think the forces and factors cited above will help the German player immensely, thereby balancing out a game which has tremendous potential for enjoyment.

Alan Augenbraun
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Plan of the Month

A Shocking French Victory

by Raymond Hosler

Here is the Plan that earned author Raymond Hosler "1st Place" in the International Wargaming Society Tournament (formerly Der Totenkopf SS) Waterloo category...

Waterloo presents an interesting challenge to the French player in that the P.A.A. have a numerical advantage toward the crucial later stages of the game. After eleven PBM games and numerous face-to-face meetings I have employed, with overwhelming success, a French strategy that will increase chances of victory. The following procedure is called SHOCK TREATMENT.

The French forces must be distributed in the following manner during the early stages of the game (16th 7am-1pm). Advance the main force to Tilly only as a diversion, then striking toward Quatre Bras by the main road. If the P.A.A. has twenty factors or more on Tilly road your feint has been effective. If only a few 1-6's are left, send three 2-6's (no more) down the road as a diversion. Next, send seven cavalry factors, no more, as a diversion to the Nivelles area. Don't commit them unless a unique situation presents itself. Finally, place approximately 30-40% of the main force around the Quatre Bras ridges.

After these positions are taken up the second stage begins. Push forward to Quatre Bras from the NW. Take a 2-1 on the ridges if possible. Shift some of the NW units to the ridges if the attack succeeds. A good opponent will put up a stiff fight on the Quatre Bras - Tilly road. The only way to break this line is to keep a solid wall of fifteen factors except for the exposed square (square able to be attacked from two or three positions) which will have the 8-4 on it. When Quatre Bras is reached it should be around 9am on the 17th.

This leads to the final and crucial step. The P.A.A. will have prepared the Genappe defense line by now. On the 17th 11am or 1pm turn the French forces must be in the following positions and ready to attack. A. The main French force extended between V-33 and V-27 with a small reserve on X-28. B. The Nivelles diversion close to Nivelles, C. The Tilly diversion blocking Wavre and threatening the P.A.A. flanks. The French are now ready to attack the Genappe line. Keep these points in mind when attacking:

1. 2-1 on R-27 (no retreat)
2. 2-1 on S-31
3. 2-1 on T-32
4. 3-1 on T-36
5. 2-1 on T-39
6. attack T-34

Every unit should be engaged with the possible exception of the diversion units at Wavre.

Take 2-1's! Shocking! That's exactly what the

P.A.A. doesn't expect. The advantages are unending. The P.A.A. is caught off guard, retreat routes are cut, no hope for counterattacks since more than one position should be pierced, many units are destroyed, and the P.A.A. is forced to expend those valuable 1-6's, covering the disorganized retreat. In short, the effect is complete. Total shock is incurred upon the army and often times your opponent as well.

NOTE: To assure the Napoleonic wargamer of a complete understanding of the strategy and tactics employed in that age I urge you to read *ON WAR* (6 vol's) by Karl von Clausewitz.

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Gamble or Play it Safe??

by William B. Searight

By the dawn's early light the coastline is a shadowy form as landing craft churn their way towards the beaches. Taut nerves reach their pitch as the ramps crash down. British, Canadian and American troops fan out to come to grips with the enemy, but initial contact is nill. How can this be? Is the invasion in Brittany or Biscay? No, the North Sea.

Numerous articles containing the initial German dispositions in D-Day are well written, but with only a one sided general strategy on how to combat an allied landing. How would such a defense hold up against weeks of combat along with pulverizing bomber launched strikes?

Normally the German defense is designed to force an allied landing as far as possible from Germany. While this is possible, the allies soon build up superiority over the local defenders and destroys the Wermacht piece meal as it advances. The great disadvantage is that numerous German divisions are still tied down to their coastal defense positions in fear of an additional invasion that may or not take place.

The set-up shown is the over all defense, although we will be concerned mainly with the N. Sea area.

I-2-2

C-8 E-9 E-II G-II G-13 L-20(2) M-22(3)
M23(2) N-24(3) Q-27(2) R-30(2) S-32(2)
S-33(2) S-34 Q-34 T-32 V-36 V-38(2)
X-42 Y-41 AA-41 LL-44

3-4-3

K-15 L-20 Q-25 Q-27 S-28 S-34

4-4-3

K-17 K-18 N-19 V-32 U-34 V-36

4-4-4

T-30 X-38 X-40 BB-40

5-5-4

I-15 FF-41

5-5-3

J-16

6-6-4

H-14 O-24

7-7-4

G-13 DD-41

I-1-3

K-13

3-3-3

L-17

O-I-4

G-9 I-12 M-15 N-21

P-23 U-29 W-35 DD-39

Reserves:

6-6-4 D-5

5-5-4 C-5 D-4 N-9

3-3-4 C-4 M-8

2-2-4 C-4

The Omniscient Wargamer

By Tom Oleson

Right after the 1967 war in the Middle East, I spoke with an Israeli pilot. He told me that their "secret weapon" was intelligence. An hour before take-off, they were given the location, to the inch, of each tank or plane they were to bomb. Incredible as it may seem, sometimes they were accurately informed of even slight changes in position moments before take-off. The only intelligence service better than that is "built-in" to all but a very few war-games, where you know the

enemy's dispositions and OOB as well as your own.

In my view, this is a serious, but unnecessary, flaw. It could be remedied in several ways:

A. Variable OOB

Why should your opponent know your OOB? In fact, why should you know it yourself (at least, to the last detail)? An element of uncertainty could be added in at least 3 ways:

1. Each side could choose among a number of OOB's balanced so that the advantages each offers are compensated for by some disadvantage. For example, less overall strength, but more at

The N. Sea defense was based on an A.H. answer concerning fortresses which resolves that even with allied units adjacent to an empty fortress, (units inside elim. by an air strike), German units may re-occupy the fortress without mandatory combat as long as the route used, before entering, does not come under a combat situation.

The following takes you one step further by showing you how the battle might take place as written from a best example.

First week: In hopes of shortening the war the Allies move 4 div. onto beach squares H-15(2) I-16 J-17. Two div. attack Ostend, but are pushed back into the sea. Bomber strikes against Amsterdam and Rotterdam result in total elim. Germans re-occupy Amsterdam (5-5-4) and fortress (5-5-3). Adjacent river positions held by inf. (4 def. factors). Reserves move towards the beaches.

Second week: Allies build up their forces with 2 armor which attack Amsterdam. Two inf. come ashore to launch a cross river attack against inf. on J-16. This attack succeeds in forcing the German inf. to pull back. Allied inf. moves across and digs in. The Amsterdam attack ends in failure (one armor forced back, the other with no retreat is elim.) Bomber attacks against reserve 6-6-4, 5-5-4 result in their elim. Germans shift 5-5-3 to I-15 and 4-4-3, I-2-2 into the fortress. Other units move normally, maintaining the paratroop defense. Additional 4 def. factor units form up behind expanded river defense.

Third week: Trying to break the German line, the Allies land two more armor and attack Amsterdam. Results, failure. Bombers immobilize the fortress units, but elim. a reserve 5-5-4. Germans move a static inf. to reinforce forces already in Amsterdam. Remainder move as necessary, maintaining a tight defense.

Fourth week: The Allies, realizing their position, are in danger now at H-15, launch air strikes to forestall a counter attack. Amsterdam units are

elim.; units in the fortress are immobilized.

As can be seen, the Germans still have a sufficient force available to shortly force the Allies back onto the islands. The Germans gambled and won this battle due to maintaining a tight paratroop defense, which prevented Allied para-units from capturing supply ports in Germany or by helping the beached forces. They could have been dropped to the south, but only into isolation.

Limited supplies and area prevented a rapid Allied build up. Even with 6 out of 8 Allied air strikes successful, the German reserves were able to absorb the losses without breaking of the line. (6 PZ. or GR. and 2 static). Although Ostend's defense was altered slightly, the Germans still have time to reinforce it as well as re-adjusting the N. Sea defense, before the next invasion.

In this test example, at no time, were any German units moved from their initial defense West of the Somme River. Of course they could have pulled out, but this would depend on the results of the N. Sea battle. Certainly things may have gone differently by the capture of Amsterdam (I-1) by causing a more extensive German defense, but as long as the fortress and D-10 were held, no Allied advance to end the war would have been possible. An extremely serious situation would have resulted if Ostend had fallen (I-2), but this low odd attack was a calculated risk.

Now the Allied second invasion must be in a comparatively safe area where he cannot be bottled up, especially since now, he is deprived of an air arm. He is also now faced against more German units, as previously explained; with reinforcements soon to be formed in Germany.

Note: Do not become careless in the N. Sea area, for the Allies could re-invade here along with his para-units which are still intact. If you try this idea and win, congratulate yourself. If not, I refuse to stand a war crimes trial.

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the outset of the game, or vice-versa. Within the framework of the overall OOB, there could be advances/delays dependent on a die roll, or drawing a card, so that *neither* side is certain of its OOB.

2. Alternatively, the selection could be at random, not by choice.

3. Each commander could "build" his own OOB from a fixed number of points, which he could "spend" on the various units available. Units available early would cost more. Fast units would cost more than slow, per combat factor. The ability of each commander to "custom-tailor" his forces could apply also to replacements and reinforcements. Besides the initial point allocation, there could be a point-generating capacity geared to possession of certain strategic areas, to give an added dimension of economic realism.

I believe these provisions would add a dimension of *strategic surprise*, since players would know only the approximate strength of their adversary, or even their own forces.

B. "Mystery" Divisions

Warfare is replete with examples of surprise and uncertainty about the enemy's tactical strength and dispositions. Even should the overall OOB be known, rarely would there be utter certainty as to its disposition. But this is what we have in nearly all wargames.

To add some *tactical surprise*, I suggest the use of units of all types which, tho distinguishable only by unit number from true combat units, would have no combat strength at all. Their only function would be to confuse the enemy. If used with the sort of point system described above, these units could have a "cost". Alternatively, the various OOB's could specify how many and what sort of these units are available. Surprise can also be achieved by allowing inverted units behind the lines, but this can cause problems with movement factor, and also can put a premium on remembering the number/location of your opponent's units. I have this same objection to not allowing "peeking" under stacked units: it makes the game too much into a contest in memorizing.

I believe these modifications would add uncertainty and surprise, and therefore realism. How about playability?

I've never played anyone I thought cheated, but no doubt some do. Therefore, an "honor system" is an inherent defect. No such system is needed to use the suggestions above. The unknown OOB's can be set aside and verified after the game as can the number of "mystery" units used. Obviously, this increases bookkeeping, and would require a monitor for PBM. As for the first drawback, I doubt that more work would be involved than that required to check one's opponent's use of replacements and reinforcements in Anzio III.

If the Allies could have seen those panzer divisions getting ready for the Battle of the Bulge, there would have been no such battle, nor are there surprises like that in most wargames. Why not?

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All — For another approach to solving these problems, see J.E. Pournelle's spread this issue.

Simulating the Art of War

by J.E. Pournelle, Ph.D.

The title of this article is a misnomer. Although I have had some experience simulating the art of war, nothing would be duller for a game; so far as I can tell, the closer the simulation, the less playable the result. The best simulation of land warfare I have ever seen takes place at Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), an Army-related think-tank in Virginia. At RAC, they have three enormous war-rooms, each equipped with a war-games table some twenty feet square, each table having elaborate terrain features at a scale of about one inch to the kilometer. In the Blue room, only Blue units and the Red units located by reconnaissance are shown; in the Red room, the opposite; while the only complete record of all units in the game is in the Control room.

Each team consists of an array of talent including logistics and supply officers, intelligence officers, subordinate unit commanders, etc. Orders are given to a computer, which then sends the orders to the actual units, while members of the Control team move them rather than the players. Both teams send in orders simultaneously, so that the computer is needed to find which units actually get to move and which are interfered with. The last time I was involved with a RAC game (as a consultant to feed in data about how to simulate strategic and tactical air strikes) it took six months playing time to finish a forty-eight hour simulation — and that was with about ten players on each side, a staff of twenty referees, and a large computer to help. The game, incidentally, was one which eventually resulted in the US Army's evolving the Air Assault Divisions, now known as Air Cav.

The point is that although an accurate simulation — it had to be, since procurement and real-world organization decisions were based in part on the results — the "war game" at RAC was *unplayable*, and, one suspects, even the most fanatical war-games buff would have found it dull after working at it full time for months.

Yet, What makes a war-game different from some other form of combat-game like chess? What is there about the war-game that can generate such enthusiasm? Obviously, it is the similarity to war; the element of simulation which is lacking from other games. Consequently, the game designer must know something about simulation, and must make realism his second goal in design.

There are two ways of making a war-game realistic. The first, which by and large has been exploited well, is "face-realism". That is, the game designer attempts to employ terrain features similar to a real world battle or war; designates units that either really were in a battle, or might have been; calls the playing pieces "armor" and "infantry", or "CCA", or "Forty-second Infantry Regiment," and the like. He tries, in other words, to give the appearance of reality. He may also, as is often done, make the rules complex, usually by adding "optional" rules to bring in such factors as "air power" or "supply", or "weather".

The second way of making a war-game realistic is much more difficult, and has seldom been tried. This method is as follows: the designer abstracts the principles of war as we know them,

and designs a game in which only the correct application of those principles brings success. There are, as I said, few of those games. I am tempted to say none, but this would be incorrect; many Avalon-Hill games partially meet this goal.

The second kind of simulation is admittedly far more difficult. To some extent it may even interfere with the "realism" of the first kind, in that some rather unusual "moves" may be required. In this and succeeding articles I shall attempt to analyze the principles of war which should be simulated, and the rules which may introduce "functional simulation" to the art of war-gaming.

Tactics or Strategy?

The first decision is a key one: do we simulate tactics or strategy? This is compounded by the problem that no really satisfactory definitions of strategy and tactics exist, and neither is very well understood in the United States. For example, there is nowhere in this country a good work on modern tactics, and the study of tactics has largely been neglected for the study of something which we call strategy, but which is often not that either. This is a large subject, and not one to be settled in *The General*; the interested reader might refer to *The Strategy of Technology*, by S. T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, University Press of Cambridge Mass. for a fuller exposition on what I mean by that statement.

The average game of strategy, in any event, would be too complex, and simulation is extremely difficult because strategy operates against the will of the opponent rather than his means. Because there is no more penalty to a war-gamer for losing utterly than there is for losing at all, it is difficult to make him surrender until his means of combat have been eliminated. I suppose rules could be devised in which a point system is employed, with a penalty to be paid for the number of points lost by the loser less those which he has gained against the winner, but then another difficulty arises: in the real world there are usually factors operating which make the victor anxious to accept the surrender of his enemy. In war games there is almost none, and consequently a player who is winning would be most reluctant to allow the loser to stop the war until the maximum number of points had been extracted. It is all a very difficult matter, and one which deserves more thought than we have time for in this article.

Consequently, we will discuss tactics more than "grand tactics", and "grand tactics" more than strategy. The subject is, I think, large enough for our purposes.

Which Principles of War?

The next problem is, which principles of war do we wish to emphasize? For that matter, which list of principles will we accept? Every serious student has his own set of "the" principles of war, and few lists are alike. Again, for our purposes, we will have to be satisfied with an arbitrary set of principles which seem appropriate for gaming, leaving the question of which are "the" principles of war to another discussion.

It seems to me that the most important principle of war neglected in popular games is the

principle of surprise. Surprise has probably won more battles than all the other factors combined. Certainly it has provided most clear wins by a side which should reasonably be expected to lose. Consequently, let us examine the characteristics of surprise as it operates in real battles, and how it might be simulated in games.

Surprise consists of doing what the opponent is certain you will not or cannot do. Classical examples are: night marches; attacks by inferior forces; the use of equipment, troops, or weapons in totally unexpected ways; attacks through impassable; and "secret weapons" which quite often have not been secret in the sense of unknown, but secret in the sense of a capability previously unexpected, as when infantry has been trained to make forced marches at speeds not thought possible.

Many of these kinds of surprise are impossible in gaming. There is no way, at least none known to me, in which we can unexpectedly increase the striking radius of the gaming pieces, or change the terrain rules in the middle of the game, or combine forces in such a way that together they have a higher combat factor than they do separately. Certainly we could do any of these things, possibly by some kind of card drawing or random number system; but the resultant would not be the mind-numbing shock of the totally unexpected, because the opponent would know from the rules that such things were possible. The true effect of surprise goes beyond the immediate effect to a paralysis of the opponent's will: if he could do *that*, then what *else* might he be able to do? Wars have been won by exploiting that kind of surprise.

We can, however, introduce surprise by imperfect intelligence; allow a player to do, if not the totally unexpected, then at least something which the opponent has dismissed as highly unlikely. The best way to achieve this at the game board, in my judgment, is through the "matchbox" system. In this system, each player has a certain number of "headquarters" type pieces, and for each such piece a matchbox or envelope. At any time a player may move a certain number of combat pieces up to the "headquarters" and take them off the board to be placed in the corresponding matchbox. The HQ then moves on the board, and the combat pieces are considered to be stacked on top of it, or, in non-stacking games, in the squares through which the headquarters has last moved. Obviously, by judicious moving of the headquarters units together and then apart, a player can create confusion as to just what units are in any given formation containing headquarters pieces, so much so that what appears to be a minor raid might well be a full armored army, while what seems to be a major attack might be a reconnaissance in force. The matchboxes are used to keep the players honest; only those pieces in the matchbox can be claimed to be with the on-the-board hq.

This rule alone can produce a major effect on war-games; I have seen the emergence of an army in a totally unexpected place bring about a paralysis of will that brought defeat to an otherwise winning player. I have also seen the fear of surprise attack stop an advance even though there was in fact no real strength opposing it. In my judgment the rule should become a "standard" rule in all board-type war games.

The second most neglected factor in war-gaming is the principle of economy of forces: the judicious combination of units of different types

to bring about a force sufficient for the objective set. Again, the really great exploitations of this principle are denied the gamer. We cannot change the rules in the middle of the game, or "discover" a new use for infantry-cavalry combinations unknown to the opponent. We can, however, provide a rich variety of really different units, each with a *special* capability.

This was discussed at great length in my previous article on "The Decisive Arm", and cannot be repeated here. Therefore, we will only examine some possibilities open to the war-gamer.

First, it seems to me, we will need *complexity*; and complexity is generally the enemy of playability. In this case there is no help for it, and what we must do is strive to make our complexities such that we do not lose ourselves in them. What we need is a variety of *kinds* of units which have some *really fundamental* differences between them, not merely differences in strength and mobility.

For example: in Waterloo, the artillery should be allowed to stack without limit. This means that a player who has husbanded his artillery can bring an enormous concentration of force against a single point — much as Napoleon was able to do. The P-A-A player, on the other hand, should be prevented from stacking dissimilar units, and in particular forbidden to place Prussians with Allies. Adding this rule and the matchbox rule produces a game of Waterloo entirely different from the standard game, and one which I think is more interesting. It automatically provides a role for cavalry as well — reconnaissance becomes absolutely necessary, with cavalry making sweeps to locate the enemy artillery prior to setting up a defensive position, or mounting a major attack. Without such knowledge, the player is nearly blinded, and can be surprised. In modern games, armor can have unique stacking capabilities, as can infantry; or infantry — armor combinations can stack.

The last principle we shall examine in this article is the Principle of Uncertainty: No Battle Plan Ever Survives Contact with the Enemy. It is the first maxim that the aspiring commander must learn.

This was, to some extent, brilliantly incorporated into the original Avalon-Hill combat results tables. It has been less and less so as time went on, and I fear the results when the new non-random combat results rules become universal as they seem destined to do.

In simulation, you can *never* eliminate uncertainties. There is always a chance that a small unit, ordered to die to a man, will in fact repulse a much larger unit ordered to attack without quarter. The chance may be small, but it is there, and the really great generals have been those who understood this and made contingency plans for unlikely events. If we are to keep realism in our war-games, we must have uncertainty.

At the same time, there is no question but that the old, rigid combat tables were wrong. The defense should have the option of bugging out to save his forces, and the attacker should have the option of making feints rather than full-scale attacks. On the other hand, the uncertainties need to be preserved. A withdrawal in the face of a cavalry attack, for example, can be very difficult and might even result in greater losses than an attempt to hold the position. The possibilities are easy to speculate on, harder to simulate.

Still, simulation is not impossible. We could

Waterloo Artillery - II

By Richard D. Thurston

Mr Brady's article in the Nov-Dec '70 issue, (which replied to my previous article in the Jul-Aug issue), has given us useful technical information, but has really missed the point in two respects. First, he has presented yet another variation on the old "morale" theme. This issue has been debated for years in these pages, to little effect. Morale of subordinate units in a board-type wargame is not very practical. In real life, the morale of a given unit depends primarily on its composition, training and unit commander, (which should be accounted for in the assigned Combat Factor); and secondarily on the unit's experiences in the field. In wargaming, individual variations in unit efficiency are accounted for in the Combat Results Table, so there is little need for additional "morale" rules.

His second major point is well taken, but points up a deficiency in game design rather than in my artillery rules. Quite simply, the hexes on the WATERLOO playing board are too large for the role they play. As he says, each hex has a diameter of 900 yards or so, which is simply beyond the range of effective 1815 — type musketry. A properly designed board would have hexes of about 300 yards diameter. We would then have infantry with a range of 1 hex, light (horse) artillery with a range of 2, and Field (heavy) artillery with a range of 3 hexes. Unfortunately, this would require a much larger board or very tiny counters.

My suggestions, and Mr. Pournelle's, though different in application, have essentially the same purpose; that is, to bring the use of artillery into proper perspective. Mr. Pournelle suggested unlimited stacking of artillery units, which is much less realistic than my approach. For one thing, this system would leave you with mountainous stacks of units which would take very careful stacking and clutter up the board beyond belief.

My plan, which calls for a two-square range for artillery, (with the long-range firing at ½ normal CF), is not based purely on mechanical and technical factors, but on a tactical concept. That concept is that Napoleonic-era artillery was employed in two ways. First, at short range, it provided additional concentrated firepower for attack and defense of critical terrain. Second, it had a "stand-off" capability in that it could attack infantry/cavalry formations at ranges at which it would be unlikely to suffer casualties from return fire.

Another point, which Mr. Pournelle very wisely pointed out and Mr. Brady ignored, was that artillery fire can be *massed* for maximum effect.

This is not possible in the AH system, but is very effective in both the Pournelle system and my own. For example, suppose that you have a PAA unit (CF = 7), which can only be attacked from two squares. Under the AH system, the most firepower that can be brought to bear on it is 30 CF (4-1). Mr. Pournelle would be able to bring up to 76 factors to bear on it (10-1); Mr. Brady could bring up to 33 with a good die roll. My system would provide up to 56 (8-1). If the unit was doubled, AH and Mr. Brady are stuck with 2-1 attacks, whereas Mr. Pournelle has a 5-1 and I have a 4-1.

I might also point out that my system also enhances the value of the "1-4" and "1-6" PAA artillery units. Instead of being thrown away as delayers or soakers, these small units can now be effectively used in support of counterattacks. They can also be very useful in pecking away at the French flanks and smaller units in the line. This can be very helpful when the French are using their light cavalry to screen river crossings and as flank protection. (This is a two-way street, though, as the French can do the same thing against the PAA).

As a practical matter, how many times have you been faced with the aggravation of being just 1 or 2 factors short of that critical 3-1 attack? Under the AH or Brady systems, you have to choose between gambling on a 2-1 and taking the consequences if it comes up "A-Elm", or letting a crucial square be given up or not attacked. Example: The PAA has a "6-4" on doubled terrain and you can only hit it from 2 squares. Do you go ahead and risk 24 factors in a 2-1 attack? Or do you just let the whole French Army grind its teeth in frustration while your cavalry tries to sneak around the end and lose 5-6 battle turns waiting for your opponent to withdraw? More likely, you attack at 1-2 and hope for a lucky die roll. Under my system (or Mr. Pournelle's), you can use your reserve firepower to breach the gap you need. A lot more realistic than just pushing a piece forward, crossing your fingers and watching the die settle down.

Really, the entire matter boils down to the two major areas of wargaming controversy. These are: Historical (and technical) accuracy *vs* playability, *i.e.* do we nit-pick ourselves into a beautiful historical simulation exercise or play a game? Second, we have the conflict between luck and skill, *i.e.* "If everything depends on one roll of the die, to hell with it. Let's get another die and shoot craps."

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develop a set of combat tables like those of [my erstwhile Diplomacy opponent] Edi Birsan in the Sept.-Oct. issue of The General. In fact, I would say, in the absence of something better the Birsan tables should be used in preference to either the old CRT or the new Kriegspiel system alone. Better tables could be devised by spending a lot more time analyzing what happens in particular situations and adjusting the probabilities accordingly; I would like to see Edi Birsan continue this, and in any event I will return to the subject in a future article.

Other future articles will analyse: the principle of pursuit; the principle of the objective; the principle of unity of command; logistics and supply; and the center of gravity, a European concept almost totally neglected in US military analyses.

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Tactics II Updated

by John Van Devender

Change has become a 20th Century fact of life everywhere, that is, except on the Tactics board.

The trouble with Tactics II is that it is a 20th Century game played with 19th Century rules. When Tactics first made the scene, back in the old days (when the sun was white dwarf, and the continents were much closer together) we old-timers hailed it as the ultimate gaming experience. Present-day owners of libraries of so-called more "advanced" games may find this statement amusing, but before I put a few noses out of joint, let me set forth reasons why I believe Tactics II, for all its faults, is still the best of all possible war games.

Like all great classic games (go, checkers, chess) Tactics is an abstract contest between equal forces. But Tactics differs with its noble ancestors in that it is a truly open-ended game. That is, Tactics is readily adaptable to all sorts of situations. At this point, the reader may rightfully ask, "So what?" Well, for one thing anyone who bothers to read this far might be assumed to have a passing interest in the fate of a good game which has fallen on evil days. For another, almost everyone with a pile of A-H games has Tactics II. The irony is that hardly anyone plays it. Many A-H "veterans" will not touch Tactics with a 10-foot battle-lance — unless they use it to "break in" a neophyte wargamer, before going on to more "serious" games.

I submit that this attitude is simply because the rules are not as up-to-date as the game situation; i.e., two modern nations dueling for control of a continent. But first, a word (or two) about rules. Serious kriegspielers possess many virtues such as patience (Anzio), honesty (Midway), nimble fingers (1914), or just being a good loser. But some otherwise well-informed and virtuous souls act as if changing a rule or two brings on a terrible Voodoo curse. Therefore, the faint-hearted need read no further. More stalwart types may push on to the first rule change.

The BTA rule is the first candidate for updating. A generous first-turn push carries forces of whomever is lucky enough to go first way over the centerfold. For the remainder of the game, his opponent struggles to overcome this advantage. All too often, he fails. Any BTA which allows units to speed halfway across the map on a single turn plays hob with strategic planning. And planning, for many of us, is half the fun of gaming. To slow things down somewhat, give armor a BTA of eight, which doubles — not triples — on roads. Reduce infantry to four BTA. I agree it is dumb for Red to take three months to get off his island, so tack a mobilization turn before turn one, which does not throw weather and third-turn replacements out of sequence.

Next we face-lift troop counters. A common gripe is that everything in Tactics II acts like an infantry — even the armor, which is just a little stronger and faster. To this I say let armor enter forests using four BTA for each square covered. On any non-road retreat, armor is eliminated. For more specialization give each nation four cavalry brigades with a combat factor of one and a BTA

of six. This will perk up peripheral battle zones (Forests) considerably. Still another bonus is to turn useless HQ's into static forts. Give them a three square range of one factor (forts cannot be eliminated if they attack) and a defense of two for a regular zone of control. Forts may move three squares once, but only on the mobilization turn. Besides adding strong points, forts may help unplug the glut of units found on the central plain after the second turn.

Now for the nuclear option. Whoever heard of two major powers with but one operational long-range hydrogen missile apiece? Undoubtedly, Tactics' inventors felt missile proliferation produced holocausts which swept both armies from the board. Real life provides evidence to the contrary, however, at least so far. Therefore, a realistic approach to updated Tactics is the presence of many nuclear weapons. Forget the rule-book option. Now add to each side any or all of the three following missile types, in any quantity, as long as the combined total numbers 20 (Yes, twenty!) 1. Attack Missile. 2. Retaliatory Missile. 3. Defense Missile. Missiles are retained by each side so long as it possesses control over at least one friendly city.

All missiles are effective anywhere on the board. Attack missiles can be used *only* as first strike weapons, with a yield of four squares in a square shape. Retaliatory missiles (second strike, same yield) are launched only after a player has been attacked by (what else?) attack missiles. One defense missile eliminates any incoming missile. Attack procedure is as follows: Attacker says his targets and the number of weapons directed at each. Defender decides which incoming missiles he will kill (write down number of missile types beforehand to avoid arguments). Simultaneously, the defender announces he is firing retaliatory missiles (if he has any) and the aggressor defends himself as best he can. After the missile exchange, no more missiles are built, and play resumes.

Any square subject to a nuclear strike should be marked off limits to all units for the rest of the game. Bombed-out cities cannot be rebuilt — a factor which affects future replacements. So long as no exchange takes place, at each replacement turn a player may elect to change one missile to another type, so long as his arsenal numbers 20 weapons.

All these options are guaranteed (well, practically) not to add a second to playing time. They do perk up the game. They add realism. And they help to drag Tactics II, kicking and screaming perhaps, but alive once more, into the present century.

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Getting it Together

by Scott M. Sherwood

Having just re-read "Barbarossa With A Purpose" (Sept.-Oct. '70) I again find myself in a state of bewilderment. I still can't believe that the author was serious about the "master plan" he presented (I hope he wasn't). As it stands the plan is fine . . . if the opponent is a dolt.

Criticism. This is easy. The author's plans for his offensive and its extension have no basis. How can one seriously approach the game and make any plans if the Russian forces are not definitely positioned? Drives "along the Koenigsberg-Leningrad" railway and an "assault" upon Brest-Litovsk sound like great fun. Such moves presume little Russian resistance. But, it is along the border region that the Soviet forces must and most often do put up their most tenacious defense. If this should fail, the Russian defense would become linear along the Dvina from Riga to Smolensk, along the Dnieper to Kiev, and from there south or to Knieper-Petrovsk. As many readers know, if the Russians have taken any losses up to this point and German losses have been moderate then the Soviets are in a difficult position. Necessity would demand that the Russian player shift to a "zone" defense of his major cities which is hard to negotiate when facing a competent German player.

Abandon the fantasies of a pre-determined, dogmatic German strategy. The *Stalingrad* battle

manuel should provide ample insights into the strategies of the game.

I'm sure most readers would rather read about methods of play than general strategy so I'll mention some techniques that may be familiar to some of you.

Railways are of great importance to the Germans and can be useful if used properly. Early in any game the German can, by maneuvering on the Russian right at Brest-Litovsk, force the Russian to abandon the area between the Nemunas and Bug Rivers north of Brest-Litovsk itself will either have to be abandoned or face a concentrated German assault. Once this move is accomplished, the German controls the junction of the Leningrad-Warsaw, the Minsk-Brest-Litovsk, and Brest-Litovsk-Miev railroads and has split the Russian front. Possession of these railways will enable the German to concentrate large numbers of troops on and near the routes of the railways either in the direction of Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev in only one move. As Russian forces are pushed back on Minsk or Kiev the German player will appreciate the mobility he has gained when shifting large units to either of the two fronts and the Russian player will be forced to distribute his forces evenly between the upper and middle Dnieper (besides the Dvina) in expectation of German thrusts in either of the areas.

As it has been written about before, don't risk

large numbers of forces of any type in 1-1 or 2-1 attacks. I prefer at least 3-1 or 4-1 attacks. Sounds fanciful, right? It should be possible, however, if one engages enemy units with care and if the most is made of one's "soak-off" capability. Try to have all your forces in positions where a breakthrough can be expected or at least have them in range of a point on which they can quickly concentrate. Railroads will aid concentration anywhere. Also keep units of low value at hand for "soak-offs". Prevent any extra losses incurred from uneven exchanges by carefully organizing all attacks and by having units of various combat factors distributed along your lines, but especially at breakthrough points.

The method of capturing major cities (Moscow and Stalingrad in this case) used or suggested most often is that of the wide flanking or double-flanking pincer movement which attempts to enclose the city and defenders in the same ring. If the German were to place pressure on a Russian flank or flanks it is frequently presumed that the Russians would not be able to resist and would summarily collapse. This is not always the case. To go head-on against Moscow or Stalingrad, while not guaranteeing the cities' seizures, will yield results if done in cooperation with a maneuver against one flank at the same time. Most often at the sight of a large body of Germans positioning directly in front of a city, the Russian player will immediately counter-attack or at least heavily defend the "direct" approaches to the city. Though not left unexposed, one or the other of the Russian's flanks will suffer from lack of troops. Press a flank attack there.

Whatever happens, don't strip your "holding lines" of troops — or at least a great number of them. An offense thrust in one region can be negated by a serious enemy operation against a weakened area.

Always exploit the special capabilities of your units, whether they be weak Rumanians or strong Panzers. This point is extremely important if the German finds himself in a maneuvering position along open terrain or when a "soak-off" is critical.

The railroad systems acquire special significance in the winter for the Germans. When snow has fallen and German lines are extended the Russian often will attack attempting to exploit the local inferiority of German troops. To prevent breakthroughs or at least stop them, the German player must carefully disposition his reserve forces along rail lines. This should be the case in good or bad weather. Not only is this mobile reserve ready for counter-attacks, but it also can be used for feints in one turn and on the next be moved great distances to bolster defense or be used for other feints.

When playing face to face, play it cool. Even if your guts are churning within, present a calm, calculating facade. Doing this can help to unnerve your opponent, and sometimes lead him to error. If you're a shrewd and convincing actor, demonstrations of "anxiety" will sometimes instill a false sense of confidence or security in your opponent.

In conclusion, as most experienced players know, have an open mind and be willing to adjust your plans to the situation and your means.

Scott M. Sherwood
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Simultaneous Movement for the Masses

by Richard Bareford

In the August 1967 (Vol. I No. 7) of *Strategy and Tactics*, Bob Reuschlin presented an article on the joys of simultaneous movement. Some time later AH came out with an optional rule for simultaneous movement in 1914. These two are the only sources on the subject that have come to my attention — possibly due to the fact that until July 1970 the only gaming literature I've read was what lurked in the AH boxes and that dusty S&T copy; imprisoned on the Isle of Corfu, as I was, the Mainstream sorta passed me by — therefore, if any of the following is old hat have pity on a provincial free-lancer.

All right, now; we're all agreed that simultaneous movement *would* be optimum, 'cause that's the way it's really done. So why are almost all the games of a consecutive nature? Time and Trouble. Routes of advance and/or retreat must be delineated exactly and in secret. The first necessity is a pain and the second often logistically difficult, being open to all sorts of bad gamesmanship. Writing out your routes, hex by hex, is perhaps easiest to do in a PBM game, as you can take your time; it is a thoroughly exasperating procedure FTF. If only you could just draw a line! The 1914 system, with its innumerable mapboard facsimiles uses such a gimmick. But still you can waste a lot of time coinciding moves, knocking counters about, erasing old moves — indeed, distinguishing your old moves from the present ones; and, of course, that paper doesn't last forever.

My answer? Acetate overlays and grease pencils.

I've found the implementation of the overlay system to be ultrasimple, devilishly realistic, and in many ways even more "playable" than the traditional forms. Equipment: Two battle-boards of the particular game to be played; two sheets of acetate (medium thickness behaves well), cut to the mapboard size; a number of grease pencils of assorted colors; and a clean, soft cloth or rag for erasing. When both players have completed indicating their units' routes with penciled lines, one player places his sheet over the other player's, making sure that they are properly indexed; battles resolved, uncontested moves completed, old positions and lines of march erased, the sheets are flipped over, and the turn's results are transferred to the other player's overlay (which is now overlaying).

Simple? Cheap, too. At least where I live, you can buy an acetate sheet large enough for two 22 x 28 mapboards for, say, \$2.50. The stuff is a pleasure to work with also; you can roll it up into a tight tube indefinitely and then have it flatten itself out in a minute or so when the tension is released. No elaborate clamping system

is required to hold the sheet to the mapboard. If you are not satisfied with the job the static charges do, just place a heavy book on top (Chandler's *The Campaigns of Napoleon* is excellent for this purpose). With reasonable care (like don't crumple or crease) the acetate should last for years.

Of course, when utilizing this system no little cardboard counters are employed. Since everything is *drawn* (and fairly securely, too; it takes a conscious rubbing action to entirely eradicate anything) you need no longer be in mortal fear of chance gusts of wind, clumsy kibitzers, or sadistic opponents. If a game is running late, just roll up your sheet and steal away into the autumn mist. These same advantages accrue even if one does not play simultaneously; standard consecutive movement games work nicely with single sheet setups and no counters.

Units may be represented on the acetate with any conceivable code, using numbers and/or exotic alphabets. These can be straight-forward designations or "real" secret codes (like in "inverted counter" 1914, you only discover what an enemy-occupied hex contains when and if you attack it; a "G-2" or "GRU" can play an important role here, especially when "phony" units are allowed).

One useful gimmick is to have the opposing orders of battle under acetate (using the excess cut from the mapboard sheet). With the grease pencil, again, write over the various units the aliases under which they are traveling, and over the enemy units their last reported designations. When it's time to bedazzle your opponent change all your codes around (easily done with cloth and pencil). With step or attrition CRTs the acetate provides a fine way of keeping track of casualties; quickly drawn tic marks over or beside the unit designation provide an easily readable accounting.

Well, once you've gotten this far you're ready for the myriad delights of simultaneous movement. A "movement sequence chart" on the model of the one appearing on page 17 of the 1914 Battle Manual is a must. Best of all, a playable simultaneous movement system as I have found this one to be offers the gamer certain prospects of epic new battles in rule interpretation. Though many of the inevitable questions can be resolved with a little common sense, quite a few points are wide open to contrary rationalizations. I would be pleased to hear some discussion on this vital subject.

Richard Bareford
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Ships that Missed the Battle -

Part I

by Stephen Lewis

The possibility of the intervention by the German Baltic Fleet in a general action between the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet was always considered by the British Admiralty. The Germans paid no attention to it. Admiral Jellicoe was eternally dredging the thing up, and worrying over it, and asking his friends didn't they think so too. They did. They also dwelt ghoulishly upon the absolute certainty that Germany would choose the moment to strike, and would strike with every ship, submarine and zeppelin on hand and in peak condition, while at any given moment the Grand Fleet could be depended upon to have: "...two battleships, one or two light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps a battlecruiser undergoing refit, in addition to whatever other vessels that might be temporarily disabled..." Reading these gloomy reports, one begins to wonder who had the bigger fleet, after all. Moreover, possible help from Dover and Harwich was discounted, owing to the Dover Patrol being made up of ungainly predreadnoughts, and the distinct possibility that the Harwich Force might not be able to find the Grand Fleet in the limitless expanse of the North Sea.

The Battle of Jutland confirmed one-half of Jellicoe's fears, in that the Grand Fleet never got the support of Dover or Harwich, and at the time of the battle there were two battleships (HMS "Emperor of India" and "Queen Elizabeth") a battlecruiser (HMS "Australia") and some light units laid up in the dockyards. But the Germans sailed missing an equal number of battleships (SMS "Bayern", in the Baltic, and SMS "Konig Albert", in the dockyards.) without any kind of support from the Baltic Fleet, without shoals of submarines and minelayers, and without flocks of zeppelins. In this, Jellicoe was disappointed, and probably Beatty was too.

Certainly if Scheer meant to crush the British fleet, as he claimed he did, religiously, he would have scraped up everything that would float and shoot, to do it with. But the German Navy was always skulking around, looking for some small part of the enemy that it could assassinate or bushwack without too much trouble. Thus we must conclude that Scheer was an heretic.

There was little to stop the German high command from switching the Baltic Fleet to Wilhelmshaven if they took a notion to it. The Baltic Fleet was a separate command, and so there might be some friction between the respective commanders, but expedience can overcome anything but its ancestor circumstance. There was also a sort of Russian Navy to worry about, but

the Russians of late have been reluctant to cast off from a nice, safe harbor until the German Army came stomping down the quays. They were still not over Tsushima, and morale was lower than a sub's keel at test depth. Granted, after a few days even the Russians would notice that there were not so many enemy ships in sight as formerly; but that would just start them worrying over u-boats. And if they did sail, what sort of work could they do? Shell a few Pomeranian cows, perhaps, with the twelve-inch guns of the "Gangut", pray that there were no subs around, and have two or three destroyers run aground, or torpedo each other — trust them to score with torpedoes when they make a mistake such as that, and trust the temperamental things to work just then, too — or surrender to an oncoming enemy island.

So, now that we have got the Baltic Fleet moving down the Kiel Canal to Wilhelmshaven and glory, let us sit on the grassy banks in Schleswig-Holstein and watch the pride of Germany pass in review. I don't mean the milkmaids, either.

Leading the procession is the new SMS "Bayern", twenty-eight thousand tons of wrath, eight fifteen-inch guns of thunder, and the speed of lightning, if there is lightning anywhere that does 22 knots. A protection factor of 14, a motion factor of 9, and fourteen hit boxes, seven fore and aft, complete the picture. She will be the Fleet flagship one day, although at the time the Fleet will be in mutiny and so the honor will be dubious.

Bobbing along in the wake of this behemoth are three predreadnoughts of the "Hessen" class, fraternal twins of the "Deutschlands". These are "Preussen", "Braunschweig" and "Elsass". There would have been a fourth, but the "Lothringen" was eternally breaking down, and blowing boilers, and springing leaks, and dropping off propellers in odd places, so Scheer, a man with absolutely no sense of humor, ordered it scrapped early in 1916.

Next come "Wittelsbach", "Wettin", "Zahringen", "Schwaben" and "Mechlenburg", five seventeen-year-old predreadnoughts of the "Wittelsbach" class. They each displace 11,800 tons soaking wet, and carry four 9.4" and eighteen six-inch guns, which means that they have two hit boxes, one fore and aft, a protection factor of 8, and a motion factor of 7 apiece. Don't be so discouraged. Look at the group as if it were one vast, slow battleship with a total of ten hit boxes and a protection factor of forty.

Following up are the last two armored cruisers in the German Navy. We started out with eight, but the war has depleted them somewhat. Perfidious Albion bagged four, three by gunfire (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Blucher) and another by torpedo. (Prinz Adalbert) The Russians, doubtless by accident, mined and sank another. (Friederich Karl) The sixth one committed hara-kari on one of its own mines a few miles from Helgoland (Yorck) Hence, these two, "Roon" and "Prinz Heinrich", are all that we have left. Each has a protection factor of 4, two hit boxes, one fore and aft, and a motion factor of 8.

With regards to light cruisers we do better: We have twelve of them. The first two, "Augsberg" and "Undine", have gunnery factors of two in a single hit box apiece, and motion factors of 8. The next pair, "Berlin" and "Kolberg", have identical gunnery factors, but motion factors of 9, and a load of 45 to 60 mines each. There is a foursome with gunnery factors of 3 in a single hit box and motion factors of 12 each, namely "Breme", "Straslund" and "Strassburg". Bringing up the rear are four 20-year-old light cruisers with hit boxes as follows: [3]1 and motion factors of 7: SMS "Freys", "Hansa", "Hertha" and "Victoria Luise". What you do with *them* is entirely up to you.

There are thirty-eight destroyers, ranging from middle-aged to senile:

DD ½Flot. 2	5-15	(3-2-2-1-1)
DD ½Flot. 7	5-14	(2-2-1-1-0)
DD ½Flot. 8	5-14	(2-2-1-1-0)
DD ½Flot. 15	6-13	(3-2-2-1-1-0)
DD ½Flot. 16	5-13	(2-2-1-1-0)
DD ½Flot. 19	6-12	(2-2-1-1-0-0)
DD ½Flot. 20	6-12	(2-2-1-1-0-0)

I would strongly recommend that these last two half-flotillas do not venture too far from shore—preferably friendly shore.

Lastly come the u-boats, U26, U28, U33, U39, U58 and U60, and that is all. There is nothing left in the Baltic now except for a few fishing boats. And the fish.

Now that Scheer has pillaged the Baltic, he must terrorize the civilians. There was a chance the the "Kaiser" class battleship "Konig Albert" could have gone out with the rest of the fleet — in point of fact, Scheer delayed sailing because of this ship in part. But the dockyard was lackadaisical. Settle the hash of those lazy workers with a roll of the die. A 1 or a 2 means that Scheer threatened them sufficiently to refit the "Konig Albert" in time, anything else means that the firing squads will be busy presently.

Now that we have brought to life Jellicoe's worst nightmares, we ought to give the Royal Navy equal time. I will deal with it next round.

Postscript: According to official German sources, sixteen u-boats and ten zeppelins were employed with the High Seas Fleet at the time of Jutland. They were: U-Boats: U19, U22, U24, U32, U44, U45, U47, U52, U53, U63, U64, U66, U70, UB21, UB22. Zeppelins: L19, L11, L13, L14, L16, L17, L21, L22, L23, L24.

Stephen Lewis
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Letters — Yes, We Get Letters

Dear Sirs,

Unfortunately, Mr. Valencourt's article, *HOLLAND 1914*, (Vol. 7, No. 4) ignored an essential fact, to wit: unlike real life, most of your French commanders in 1914 are reasonably competent.

On the first turn, Mr. Valencourt invades Holland and with his superior force, begins crushing them. His once unsuspecting Allied opponent becomes suspicious and covers his northern border with a wall of 6-10-3's. After Mr. Valencourt has destroyed the Dutch army, his cavalry 'sweeping through Belgium' are confronted by the much stronger French force. On turn nine, the French commander clobbers Mr. Valencourt's cavalry and advances into Belgium. On turn ten, Mr. Valencourt has hopefully stopped the French advance and stabilized his line. So what? He's gained even fewer points than he had hoped for. Even if by some miraculous reason Mr. Valencourt does stop the French and achieves his ultimate desire, (102 points for the Germans plus about 30 for Metz and Strassburg vs. a total of 126 points for the French), and even if he gets an unlikely 100 points from the East, he gets a tactical victory which means he will almost surely lose. To finish my letter, I quote Geoff Burkman "I have nothing to say... except... I'll play you by mail anytime, and I'll guarantee that you'll lose." (*The General* Vol. 6 No. 4).

"If you add the French corps he will hopefully destroy."

Thomas Wilbur
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Lake Forest, Ill. 60045

Dear Sir:

I wish to present rebuttal to the invalid criticisms in the article "Heller's Folly" by Lt. Richard A. Shagrin, which appeared in the last issue, Vol. 7, No. 4. Lt. Shagrin's criticisms center around the rule, "when there is more than one road equidistant and at intersections, the loser has the choice of retreat route." But, there is only one road available, and there fails to exist an intersection. Secondly, the retreat of the 99th and 2nd towards Monschau by advancing German units had been confirmed by the Avalon Hill Research & Design Dept. long before I devised the plan. Lt. Shagrin criticizes the assault on Eisenborn ridge as being prone to engagements. He fails to realize that engagements in this sector will result in a breakthrough via the St. Vith-Clervaux Corridor. The placement of Panzer Lehr at QQ17 and 326/561 at PP20 is also criticized. Panzer Lehr was placed at QQ17 for the purpose of exploiting the breakthrough in either the central or northern sector. A single regiment placed at QQ17, as suggested by Lt. Shagrin, can by no means serve the same purpose. 326/561 was placed at PP20 so that, on the following turn, it could move to the road at QQ21 and attain mobility. Since U.S. units will have to arrive from the South, there is no need to control QQ19. Lt. Shagrin is willing to commit 9/CCA in a fortress at Diekirch, which can be easily by-passed, instead of benefitting from its placement at the vital areas of defense. Lt. Shagrin is content to accept an inglorious victory in the latter half of the game, instead of achieving a decisive victory in the first few days. I suggest that Lt. Shagrin study my comments so that he can better appreciate my strategy.

Randy Heller
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Dear Editorial Staff,

We were miffed when you ignored us, but then when you do mention us (*Magazine Rack* — 7.4), I can only wonder when you intend to pull your heads out of the sand. The *Kommandeur* is not "relevant only to AHKS members...", but has, in our opinion, risen near the top of amateur zines in content.

I would appreciate it if you would correct the erroneous information regarding the KOM-

MANDEUR. It is a comprehensive map game journal, with articles for everyone. One year's subscription (quarterly) costs \$2.00.

The Avalon Hill
Intercontinental Kriegspiel Society
R. E. Johnson, Vice President-Editor
P.O. Box 134
Whippany, N.J. 07981

All — *The KOMMANDEUR is a comprehensive map game journal with articles for everyone. (Sand in the eyes really smarts.)*

To the Editor:

I strongly support Donald Greenwood's suggestions on layout. I'm sure many of the typos in the Opponents Wanted section are from trying to read ads squeezed onto your form. You need only require that ad requests be typewritten. Surely it is not that difficult to check the number of words in a typed request.

You could prevent the recurrent criticism of the necessity of mutilating the *General* by putting the Club Registration form (if it is necessary) and the instructions about Subscriber Discount on the back of the Contest form. Then you could put the discount coupon itself in the upper right corner of the Opponents Wanted page (backing the "Infiltrator's Report" heading).

The "Heller's Folly" article should have been returned to the author for a rewrite. It borders on the vicious. Your editorial policy should prohibit personal attacks.

Peace.

David C. Bell
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AH — all you had to do was ask... see format change this issue.

Dear Editor,

Has anyone in wargaming ever considered the idea of a country-wide unified organization for wargaming that would be the equivalent to the United States Chess Federation?

Looking at the general scene from a viewpoint of some one not involved in a club or league or whatever, it makes sense. As it stands now you have a host of local groups and a few that are much more widespread and in competition with each other. That wastes efforts and resources, something a "movement" as small as this one can't really afford.

Each local area which had sufficient personnel would have a local chapter, and these would be grouped into geographic regions (such as Los Angeles Basin or San Francisco Bay Area) compact enough to provide inter-club competition. Above that, there would be state and national levels charged mainly with administration and major tournaments.

PBM could be handled through a much larger network, instead of being restricted to your own club; each PBM player would then have more of a chance of finding someone interested in playing the particular game he is interested in.

Rules and rating systems could be standardized nationwide, ending this mess of who is better than who — everyone would know at a glance at his opponent's rating just how strong he really is. PBM could be then set to pit pro versus pro and amateur versus someone he has a chance of beating. There is very little glory in clobbering a novice (at least for me) and not too much to be learned from playing someone who is so head-and-shoulders above you that his moves seem veritable magic.

I won't go on listing advantages, but I think it is pretty clear that this kind of set-up could do a lot to help the hobby and the individual player.

One last note: for those of you concerned with the "dictatorial" or bossy aspect of such a system, that in large measure depends on just how grown up we all are. I've never felt anything like that in USCF, and I don't think it follows automatically from centralized organization.

M.S. Buynoski
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Dear Sirs;

Readers who are unfamiliar with the truly darker days of our hobby should not believe Mr. Greenwood's statements (Nov-Dec) about the qualities of first issue articles. He said, "First years' articles in the *General* were waste of space garbage which the General was forced to use." This gives a false impression of those early issues. In point of fact, each issue was eagerly anticipated and every single printed word was read, re-read and memorized. If the articles had been as bad as Mr. Greenwood says, the General would have failed.

Greenwood has forgotten that in issue No. 1 Carl Knabe described his revolutionary PLAN RED for D-DAY which made it impossible for the German player to lose. Players who followed Knabe's PLAN RED won so often as the Germans that A.H. had to redesign the game and invent air power to give the American side a chance of winning.

Another mind boggling article came from Hilary Smith who described a game which began in 1939 and ended in 1945. It used 6 players, included every major and minor power in Europe and was played on a 3 by 5 foot map of Europe. Hilary had a club, which was highly unusual in those days, and his boys would play this game for weeks on end. It was quite a shock to realize that they had devised their own war game and were playing it together. Multi-player games where each has his own army, air force and Navy were unheard of in those days!

My contribution to that issue was "How To Win Without Really Playing." In that article I outlined Zocchi's infamous dirty dozen tricks which told all the little things one could do while playing that would give you the psychological edge over your opponent. If this was so bad that A.H. was "forced to use it", can Mr. Greenwood

explain why I was asked to do more articles along the same lines? At the risk of sounding conceited, I believe this was the best article I ever wrote.

Those of you who are new to this hobby should understand something about Mr. Greenwood. He publishes his own paper (*Panzerfaust*) and maintains a high degree of professionalism. I feel that the burden of regular publication and his broadened wargaming experiences have jaded his judgement to the point where he has lost perspective. In those early days the General was the only standard around which we could rally and we thought it was wonderful. Today there are many wargame publications from which to choose, but most of the old General articles are every bit as interesting as anything any of the new ones can offer. I admit that the General deliberately stirred up controversy by running two articles side by side which were as opposite as could be, but even this procedure was beneficial. One author claimed that Side No. 1 never lost in such and such a game and the author claimed that side No. 1 never wins. Readers knew that one of the authors was completely wrong and it was interesting to try out the proposed sure fire plans and see for oneself which had been guilty of faulty logic. In some cases, it turned out that the logic was wrong, but the author did uncover new areas of problem solving techniques and it was his tactics rather than his strategy which was winning his battles.

If A.H. ever reprints some of those vintage articles, I'm sure you'll find them just as interesting as today's works.

Louis Zocchi
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Subscriber Discount

The coupon printed on the reverse side may be applied toward the purchase of all Avalon Hill products. Each coupon is worth 25 cents. However, no less than 4 coupons can be used in any one purchase. Orders received accompanied by three coupons or less will be returned unfilled. Any number above 4 may be used in any single purchase. No photostats please...

Contest No. 41

It is the 28th anniversary of the initial campaign in STALINGRAD. The Russian Defensive setup below simulates what its historical counterpart might have been 28th years ago. Here as the German commander you must initiate an attack plan that, in the opinion of Avalon Hill, holds the best chance for strategic success. Objective in this instance is advance into Russia with attrition of Russian units secondary.

You have a total of 115 attack factors to assign as you see fit. Simply write in on the squares adjacent to the Russian units the total number of factors representing German units you would place there.

The ten entrants who come closest to what our experts consider is the optimum strategy will be awarded gift certificates. Entries must be postmarked no later than February 15, 1971. Please state what you think are the three best articles of this issue. This selection has no bearing on the contest but entries not bearing this information will be voided. Entrants using the reverse side for submission of an ad are assured that the ad will be picked up.

Attack Factors of Units Available: 8888 7766665555544444



Headlines of 3 Best Articles:

Name _____
Street Address _____
City _____ State _____ Zip _____

The Question Box

BLITZKRIEG

Q: If I capture and isolated enemy city with 12 of my airborne factors, may I air transport 12 additional factors to that city on the next turn?

A: Yes, but in doing so you overload the supply capacity of your airhead and must either capture additional supply cities or eliminate factors on the turn following the overload to "balance" your supplies. **EXAMPLE:** 12 factors of Blue airborne troops capture 00-40 on turn No. 3. 00-40 is behind Red lines and no supply route exists to a friendly port or supply line; thus, the Blue airhead has a supply capacity of 12 factors (one city square). On turn No. 4, Blue airlifts 12 factors of infantry to 00-40 to support his airborne troops, thereby overloading the supply capacity of the airhead by 12 factors (here we assume Red has just been watching this happen to himself, and has not eliminated any Blue factors). Blue now has one turn to (1) capture another city square to supply the additional troops, or (2) move them out again by airlift. If he accomplishes neither at the end of his portion of turn No. 5, he must eliminate factors until only 12 remain in the airhead; this brings his supply situation there back into balance.

To sum up: a player always has one turn in which to rectify a supply imbalance, but supplies for each "overloaded" area must be balanced by the end of the turn immediately following the turn in which the imbalance occurs.

Q: Can you attack enemy units *At Sea*?
A: No!

ANZIO:

Q: If the Germans close off the South End, can the Allies continue their Build-Up off the board?
A: Yes.

Q: If the Allies invade Feb. 11, does HG return to game?
A: Yes.

Q: Commandos can land up to five squares from an invasion beach, but how is this measured?
A: Along the coast, not over water.

Q: Can the Allies overstock a beach and then alternately shift units back and forth so that the beach is continually above capacity?
A: No.

Q: When Monarchist units enter the game can they use strategic movement on the first turn?
A: No. Also, they cannot enter at Naples unless it has a port counter.

Q: A unit is forced onto a river square as the result of first combat. If it is attacked again on second combat and forced across the river, is it eliminated?
A: Yes.

BULGE:

Q: Using the optional weather table, if the weather clears up on the roll before the German 24 AM turn, when is the movement rate of the German units reduced?
A: 24 hours later: during the 25 AM turn.

The following are all of the Question Box entries from past issues of the GENERAL that are still valid for STALINGRAD:

Q: Can Italian and Hungarian units be placed in Finland?
A: No. No additional units can be placed in Finland after the first turn.

Q: Can Rumanian units start in Finland?
A: Yes. However, the number of non-Finnish combat factors that may start in Finland may not exceed 8.

Q: Can units be placed next to the Hungarian border on the first turn?
A: Yes.

Q: Can the narrows at the Sea of Azov be used as a supply route?
A: No.

Q: Do defending units get doubled defending behind the Luga, Volkhov, or Svir Rivers if they are on a swamp square?
A: Yes.

Q: If the German attacks a doubled 5-7-4 and gets an exchange, how many attack factors must the German remove?
A: At least 14.

Q: Can one friendly unit move into an enemy ZOC (and attack no unit) while a second friendly unit attacks the enemy unit(s)?
A: No. All units in enemy ZOC MUST attack some enemy unit.

Q: If a unit on a river is attacked from a fork in the river and from a different river square, is it doubled?
A: No. A unit on BB-22 attacked from CC-22 and CC-21 would defend at basic odds.

Q: If a replacement city is surrounded by enemy ZOC, it loses its replacement capacity; but, can accumulated replacements be started in that city?
A: No.

Q: Can a unit in the ZOC of an enemy unit move one square into the ZOC of another enemy unit and attack the second unit?
A: Yes, as long as the attacker has not moved THROUGH the ZOC of any one enemy unit.

The following include all of the Question Box entries from past issues of the GENERAL that are still valid for WATERLOO:

Q: If the first retreat square is a woods square or a river square, is the unit eliminated?
A: Yes. (If the square contains a road, the unit may retreat on the road.)

Q: Are attacks at less than 1-6 allowed?
A: Yes. (H.Q. units may not attack.)

Q: Exactly where may French units start?
A: French units may start off TT-15, SS-15, RR-15, RR-14, QQ-15, PP-15, OO-16, OO-15, PP-14, PP-13 and on the road to and including JJ-13.

Q: Exactly where may Prussian units start the game?

A: Prussian units may start on row EE or north of EE, and ON or east of Y-26, Z-25, AA-25, BB-24, CC-24, DD-23 and EE-23.

Q: Can a unit traveling along clear terrain enter a road-woods square and continue along the road in the same turn?

A: Yes. A unit can move from E-38 to E-39 to E-40 and then along the road in the same turn.

Q: Can H.Q. units delay enemy units?
A: No.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Q: Why must The General clutter up its pages with useless, space-taking forms such as "Opponents Wanted," and "Club Registration" forms? Why can't subscribers simply write such things down on pieces of paper?

A: When subscribers were not given the benefit of "forms," we found it difficult to interpret the longhandmanship. And, too, they tended to include such things on the same paper with orders, requests for brochures, etc., making it much more difficult to handle than via present methods. Believe us, it has worked out far better this way.

Q: Why is it so difficult locating Avalon Hill games in retail stores?

A: Like any product that is not mass-market in nature, the lack of consumer demand makes distribution to all stores impossible. Fortunately, the "repeat sales" nature makes AH games very profitable ventures for those relatively small number of outlets now stocking. You — the subscriber — are the key to widening the distribution level. Bug your favorite store often enough — eventually it will stock AH games.

Q: How do I get on the Avalon Hill Consumer Test Panel?

A: For best testing results, prototypes are sent only to wargame clubs and organizations boasting at least 8 members. This way one prototype, which is an expensive production vehicle, can be circulated among the maximum number of participants. For approval to this panel, one must submit a list containing names, addresses, and short personal resumes of at least eight persons they can call upon.

Q: Can you tell me what stores in my area carry AH games?

A: Not entirely. Upon occasion we will ship directly to retail outlets. But in 95% of the cases, we ship to wholesalers who in turn deliver to retail outlets. Thus we have very little knowledge of who really sells them. But if you tell us the largest city within 100 miles of your town, we will send you the name of the wholesalers serving your area. who can furnish you with name of your local retail outlets.

25¢

25¢

Save this Discount Coupon

GOOD TOWARD THE PURCHASE OF ALL AVALON HILL PRODUCTS

25¢

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1971

25¢

Opponents Wanted

All ads for opponents will be inserted as a free service to subscribers, one ad per subscriber per issue. Ads will not be repeated from issue to issue; however, subscribers may re-submit the same ad or new ads for each succeeding issue.

Please print or type your advertisement on the spaces provided below, maximum 35 words per ad (including name and address).

"For Sale, Trades," and requests other than for opponents will be inserted only when space permits. Ads received after the 15th of the month preceding publication will appear in the following issue. Subscribers using the reverse side as a contest entry are assured that it will be picked up.

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30

NAME

STREET ADDRESS

CITY

STATE

ZIP



Quality control all down the line is the credo at Avalon Hill. Here, cameraman Stanley Glaser picks up an error to Lou Velenovsky that got by the design department. "Sometimes we even have to show the designers how to unfold the mapboard," muses Glaser who, like all the others in the printing end of the company, are ever-vigilant in their quest for higher standards.

Infiltrators Report

MERRY XMAS TO ALL subscribers who have "grown" with *The General*, particularly those who sent us Xmas cards — a most gratifying gesture.

GAMES 101 is a brand new course on Beginning Wargaming that "Professor" John P. Bobek teaches at the U. of Illinois Circle Campus Alternate University. Bobek's field of endeavor is Secondary Education and since his hobby is wargaming, he was the natural choice of the Dean instituting this elective course. The course runs approximately 10 weeks; in due time this column will be able to make a full report on the progress of the class. Alternate University is an attempt to set up a learning community on Circle Campus. A learning community is where one is not lectured at, but where people discuss; a place where generative ideas and individual thinking are encouraged. Games 101, 117 Taft Hall, deals with an introduction to wargaming including an examination of its history and theory on the macro and microcosmic levels. Lab work is assigned on Tuesdays after 4 P.M. in the east cafeteria. A similar project is being explored in far off Brazil; David Robinson and Rick Britton are developing a mini-course on military strategy, tactics, and wargaming for implementation at the Assosicao Escola Graduata de Sao Paulo. All that remains now is for someone to come up with a correspondence course on wargaming — under the G.I. Bill, of course

DRAKE PUBLISHERS, LTD. announces its newest release, "Battles With Model Soldiers." Retailing for \$5.95 it is available from the publisher at 440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

POMPADOUR DOMINION puts out a catalog of available games that beats anything we've seen locally. General Manager Peter Statner claims that with its "unique and original classification system of all major games in the adult and family game line" the catalog is the first of its kind ever published. This publisher has more than just a passing interest in games; they claim to be the first Canadian retail outlet to stock games exclusively and on a year-round basis. Known as GAMEWAYS, the company also wholesales to some dozen boutiques all across the province of Ontario and in Quebec. The unique catalog may be purchased by sending a U.S. dollar to 91 Bloor Street West, Suites 301-302, Toronto 181, Ontario, Canada.

THE CHAMPION STOCKISTS FOR AH GAMES IN CANADA is currently Canadian Merchandisers, 1111 Finch Avenue, Unit 25, Downsview, Ontario who has been responsible for tripling the exposure of AH games to interested Canadians. We suggest that all Canadian friends contact either of these outlets for direct purchases — that way the high import duty can be by-passed.

AMONG THE MORE DEDICATED WARGAMERS must be Dana Lombardy. A notice in the I.W.S. Tournament Bulletin states that Dana . . . "made a wargaming tour of the east last summer, attending three conventions and seeing many gamers throughout the east, midwest, and south." A story of his journey, with pictures, which indeed must be an unusual one, is to be sent to each player that finishes play undertaken in the I.W.S. tournament. Surplus editions of his story will hopefully be made available to those participating in their 1971 tournament — info is available from Dana Lombardy, 954 Kittiwake Lane, Chula Vista, Cal. 92011. Meantime, hows about sending us a copy now, Dana old fellow

IN DIGESTING D-ELIM, the wargame journal of St. John's University's Military Strategy Club, we are reminded of George Phillies' "Guide to Wargaming Periodical Literature." This quarterly publication lists and catalogs all the articles in just about every wargaming publication, invaluable for anyone interested in what really goes on behind the literary scene. A year's subscription costs \$3.00 from Phillies, 505C, 305 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

CONTEST NO. 40 SOLUTION: There are two obvious paths that the solution to this tactical problem could take: but one is much more efficient than the other. The less efficient solution envisions an outright assault on the 10/CCR, with 3-1's on the other two surrounded units and soaks on the remaining two. But the probability of this attack contacting or destroying the CCR is 5/6 with exchange and no sure kill on the 506 or 501. The alternative is to hit the 506 and 501 @ 6-1 each. By occupying these two squares with more than 16 factors, you make impossible soak-offs and counterattacks by the American in his turn. The attacks are most efficiently made in this fashion:

Attack Order	Defender	Attacker	Odds
1.	506	9/20, Lehr/2	6-1 (S)
		326/562, 5/9.	
2.	501	Lehr/1, 2/8	6-1 (S)
		2/17.	
3.	CCR	62/123.	1-2 (S)
4.	502	326/562.	1-2
5.	327g	326/561, 2/7.	3-1
		227/553.	

The maximum number of sure-kills is three. There are three exchange situations, undoubled with the worst being the loss of the 2/8 in Battle No. 2. The probability of capturing Bastogne is still 5/6, the only unfavorable results being an engaged which you have at all odds between 1-4 and 4-1.

In this plan, the overriding feature is to exclude the possibility of American counterattack from strong formations they are assumed to have in the area at this late date (after 23AM). Attacks could be made on the CCR, 506, and 501 at 1-5

but this is weak because a) it opens the possibility of A Elim, and b) leaves no chance of D-Elim on the CCR (1/6 at 1-2 in our solution), and c) does not kill a 'killable' unit (the 506) in violation of objective no. a. If the engaged does not come up in Battle No. 3, then on the U.S.'s half of the turn the CCR will have to attack at 1-6 or worse which will accomplish objective no. c for the Germans. There is no way that the CCR can be attacked that would assure a kill, and the 1-2 against it accomplishes the same results; with the same probability of success, with a more efficient use of force, as the maximum 4-1.

In the contest form, as it is printed, it is not possible to analyze a contestant's advances after combat. Therefore, in judging the entries, importance must be placed in the units attacking the 501; because that is the only square wherein the German units cannot be reached by an American counterattack in aid of the CCR which must attack those units if not engaged or eliminated. To successfully accomplish this, at least 18 factors must attack the 101/501.

Maximizing all possible results, we find that there is the *possibility* to:

- a) Destroy four enemy units.
- b) Lose three German units (14 factors).
- c) Take Bastogne in the German's turn.

Minimizing all possible results we find the *possibility* to:

- a) Destroy two enemy units.
- b) Lose no units (German).
- c) Not take Bastogne.

By taking the expected values of the probabilities: $E(Z) = v$, we find:

- a) Expect to destroy 2 and 2/3 units.
- b) Expect to lose 1/2 German unit.
- c) Expect to take Bastogne 5/6 of the time.

Any other results are, in our opinion, less than optimum.

TEN CONTEST NO. 40 PARTICIPANTS coming closest (most matched it identically) to our tactical solution were: Charles A. Froggatt, Claymonth, Delaware; Bruce Chamberlain, E. Hartford, Conn.; John Moriarty, N. Wales, Pa.; Richard Anderson, Livermore, Cal.; Richard A. Leiby, Mertztown, Pa.; George Rompott, Mt. Vernon, Iowa; Dennis Milbert, Denver, Colorado; Bob Karaluna, Warren, Michigan; Michael O. Fike, Parma Heights, Ohio; and William Drakert, W. Plains, N.Y.

THE VOTING SPREAD ON LAST ISSUE'S literary efforts were so mixed that picking the top five required a recount by your editorial staff. A virtual 3-way tie in total mentions existed between Glenn Davis' "Plan of the Month," Mark Morss' "Fabian Stalingrad," and Donald Greenwood's "Buyers Guide." A count of first-place votes, only, decided the top three in the above order mentioned. Kevin Slimak's "Midway in Focus" took 4th place and Lawrence Valencourt sneaked into 5th with "Holland 1914." Actually, a 3-way tie also existed here with Valencourt winning out on greatest number of first-place votes. Honorable mentions go to T/Sgt. Robert A. Burge for Part II of his "Tac Air in D-Day" and 1st Lt. Richard A. Shagrin for "Heller's Folly."

